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Abstract. This paper presents a Median Voter Theorem for a class of one-dimensional
voting situations where individual preferences need not be single-peaked, but nonetheless
satisfy a strong regularity condition. This condition arises when cartels with identical
marginal costs vote on quotas [Cave and Salant, 1987] and also arises in the case of both
agricultural marketing boards and prorationing boards restricting extraction from common
properties.
The research for this paper was supported in-part by the National Science Foundation program on
Political Science (Grant No. 8696084).

A MEDIAN CHOICE THEOREM
This paper presents a Median Voter Theorem for a class of one-dimensional voting
situations where individual preferences need not be single peaked, but satisfy a hierarchical
ordinal equivalence condition.
Let A be a one-dimensional space of alternatives. The voters are denoted i =1,...,L, where L
is odd. The ordinal preferences of voter i form a complete and transitive weak ordering Ri
on the members of A. A [strict] Condorcet winner is a distinguished member a* of A such
that more than half the voters [strictly] prefer a* to any other alternative.
It is well known that if each voter i has a most-preferred or "ideal" point Ii, and the
preferences Ri are single-peakedi the median ideal point is a Condorcet winner.
In this paper, individual preferences are not single-peaked, but their distribution satisfies a
strong regularity condition. This structure emerges clearly in the system of marketing orders
studied by Cave and Salant (1987).
That paper considers firms whose endowments of a homogeneous product can be sold on
either an inelastic primary market or an infinitely elastic secondary market. A committee
composed of such firms votes on the division of output between the two markets, selecting a
uniform prorate level F e [0, 1]. Each firm can sell up to F times its endowment on the
primary market. As F falls below 1, firms with small endowments are the first to be
constrained. The profit functions of constrained firms are multiples of each'other
[proportional to endowment]. All unconstrained firms prefer tighter constraints as long as
they themselves are not constrained, since such constraints restrict the amount their rivals put
on the market without limiting the market power of the unconstrained firms.
What is important for the structure of preferences is that each voter has an associated "cut-
off" level. Alternatives above the cut-off are ranked in decreasing order, and the ordinal
preferences of all voters coincide below their cut-off levels.
1. i.e., any cardinal representation of Ri is quasi-concave.
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Formally, we posit the existence of a cut-off level Ci e A for each voter i. The voters are
numbered in increasing order, i <j implies Ci s C. The median voter under this numbering
is denoted m = (L+1)/2.
Voter i's preferences, Ri, are assumed to satisfy three conditions.
Assumption 1: each voter has a unique ideal oini. -. -
Assumption 2 ["ordinal nesting"]: Ri agrees with Rj below min{Ci, Cj}:
(1) a,b min(Ci, Cj) implies [aRib iff aRjb].
Assumption 3: each Ri is monotone above Ci:
(2) a k b k Ci implies bRia.
These assumptions ensure that Im, the ideal point of the median voter, is a Condorcet
winner. The discussion uses weak inequalities and breaks all ties in favor of Im- If
Assumption 3 is strengthened to strict monotonicity, Im is the unique strict Condorcet
winner.
Before proving this result, we note some properties of this preference structure.
Monotonicity implies that each voter's ideal point lies at or below his cut-off level:
(3) Ii : Ci.
Moreover, the ranking of voters by ideal points coincides with their ranking by cutoff levels:
(4) i <j implies Ii5s Ij.
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To see this, note that Ci < Cj by defmition. If Ij> Ci, then It 5 Ij by (3). Alternatively, if
Ij < Ci, (3) implies that both voters' ideal points Ii and Ij lie below Cj. From (1), voters i and
j must rank them in the same way. Therefore, in this case Ii = Ij.
Applying this argument repeatedly we obtain a congruence property:
(5) If i< j and Ij S<Ci, thenIIi=i+1=.---Ij2
We now state our main result:.
MEDIAN CHOICE THEOREM: if the preferences of the voters satisfy Assumptions 1-3, the
ideal point of the median voter [Im] is a Condorcet winner.
Proof: Consider any a < Im. By (1), a and Im will be ranked in the same way by the
majority coalition (m, ..., LI. Hence Im defeats a in pairwise voting.
Now consider the only remaining possibility: that
Cm-k Im s min (Cm..k+1, a)
All voters in the set (1, ..., m-k) rank a and Im according to monotone preferences (2), and
therefore prefer Im to a. By the congruence property (5), Im is the ideal point of all voters in
the set {m-k+1, ..., m}. Therefore, Im is preferred to a by every member of the majority
coalition (1, ..., m). QED
Assumption 1 ensures that all voters whose preferences agree with those of the median voter
strictly prefer Im to the alternative a. It follows immediately that Im is the unique strict
Condorcet winner if assumption 3 is replaced by strict monotonicity.
2. Property (5) can be compared with Roberts' (1977) condition of "hierarchical
adherence," defined for continuous cardinally comparable preferences over a two-
dimensional space of alternatives. The two properties are logically independent.
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There are other models in which voter preferences satisfy these assumptions. Consider a
situation in which a public bad such as pollution is to be controlled, and where voters have
different thresholds below which they are personally unaffected. Assumptions 1-3 amount
to the conditions that personally affected people prefer lower levels of pollution, and that
preferences below an individual's threshold level are determined by a common set of ethical
and cost considerations. Since we only use ordinal preferences, this is not a statement about
interpersonal comparisons or intensity of prefererice. - - - - -
We do not suggest that this result solves either applied problem, but it certainly forms part of
the solution. It predicts majority rule decisions and allows comparison with outcomes under
other forms of organization, such as product allocation in the absence of marketing boards or
private pollution abatement efforts.
The median choice result also facilitates analysis of changes in the underlying system that
induces preferences. For instance, if the voters of the theorem are selected from a larger
population according to some such mechanism as weighted majority rule, it is necessary to
identify committee compositions with outcomes in order to analyze the process of
committee selection. The same technique can be used to analyze changes in the distribution
of cut-off and/or ideal points.
The foregoing analysis assumes sincere voting. It is well known that simple majority rule is
vulnerable to manipulation. While we have no general results to offer in this regard, it can
be argued that it does not benefit any voter to misrepresent his preferences, so long as the
reported preferences atisfy Assumptions 1-3. Formally, this is captured in the following
result.
NASH EQUILIBRIUM THEOREM: if a player misrepresents his cut-off and/or ideal points
in such a way that Assumptions 1-3 remain satisfied, he will not prefer the resulting outcome
to Im.
Proof: First, it is clear that misrprepseatation will not affect the result unless it changes the
ideal point of the median voter. The median voter clearly cannot gain by distortion.
Another voter i # m can only affect the result if he shifts the identity of the median voter by
pretending to be on the "other side" of m.
Suppose first that i < m; by misrepresentation i can obtain any outcome in the interval
[Im, Im+1]. By claiming a cut-off point in the interior of this interval he becomes the new
median voter and achieves his "pretended ideal." More extreme misrepresentation makes
m-i the new "median voter". In any case, i can only increase the voting outcome. The
monotonicity property (2) ensures that i will not wish to do this.
Now consider i> m; by misrepresentation i can obtain any outcome in the interval
[Im-1' Im]. By the ordinal nesting property [Assumption 2] i and m rank all points in this
interval in the same way. Therefore, i prefers Im to all other points in [Im- 1. Im], and
cannot profit by distortion. QED
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